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and advocates in pursuit of a vision of inclusive and effective democracy. Our mission 
is to develop and implement an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of scholarship, public 
education, and legal action that promotes equality and human dignity, while safeguarding 
fundamental freedoms.
About the Brennan Center
5.
About the Democracy Program
The Brennan Center’s Democracy Program seeks to bring the ideal of representative 
self-government closer to reality. Our program collaborates with grassroots groups, 
advocacy organizations, academics, and reform-minded government officials to eliminate 
barriers to full and equal political participation. We strive to ensure that public policy and 
institutions reflect the diverse voices and interests that make for a rich and energetic 
democracy.
One of the primary areas of focus of the Democracy Program is campaign finance reform. 
The Brennan Center has been a leading force in framing the debate on free speech 
implications of campaign finance regulation. In addition to publishing extensively on the 
policy and law of campaign finance, the Center’s Democracy Program counsels legislators, 
reformers, and officials at the federal, state, and local levels on policy implications and legal 
and constitutional issues surrounding campaign finance reform. The Democracy Program 
also specializes in other electoral issues such as ballot access and voting rights. The 
Center serves as counsel or co-counsel in litigation necessary to protect the principle of 
equal opportunity for political participation.
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10. BUYING TIME 2000
T elevision advertising has become the weapon of choice for the players in contemporary pres-idential and congressional campaigns. Broad-casters reap a bonanza from fierce competition 
among candidates, parties, and interest groups for scarce 
and increasingly expensive airtime in the weeks before 
Election Day. In large part, corporations, unions, and 
wealthy individuals who circumvent longstanding federal 
campaign finance laws supply the huge infusions of cash 
that make it possible to charge premium rates for tele-
vision time. This study of political television advertising 
in the 2000 federal elections builds upon the Brennan 
Center’s prior report on the 1998 congressional races to 
document the nature and magnitude of one of the most 
intriguing innovations in campaign law evasion: what is 
widely known as “issue advocacy.” 
 The concept of “issue advocacy” dates back to 1976, 
when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo. The 
Buckley court was concerned that the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) might improperly regulate politi-
cal conduct that was not actually electioneering and that 
vague statutory language might chill speech by political 
players who were uncertain about the law. To save FECA, 
the court interpreted it to apply only to communications 
that “expressly advocated” the election or defeat of a fed-
eral candidate. The court listed examples of explicit words 
of electioneering—such as “vote for,” “vote against,” and 
“elect”—that would indicate express advocacy. Some lower 
courts then decided that Buckley’s examples of express 
advocacy constituted a test of electioneering. 
 The result of this “magic words test” is that as 
long as parties and groups omit certain explicit words 
such as “vote for” or “cast your ballot for” in their ads, 
huge campaign advertising expenditures can escape legal 
constraints. Ads by parties and groups that eschew the 
“magic words” are considered issue advocacy under this 
standard, whether or not their intended purpose is elec-
tioneering. 
 Issue advocacy under this broad definition has become 
a major loophole in campaign finance law because elec-
tioneering issue ads are usually treated as genuine issue 
ads for regulatory purposes. Evading the law intended to 
govern them, campaign ads that avoid magic words mas-
querade as ads informing viewers about a public issue. As 
a result, parties and groups can skirt disclosure require-
ments, dodge contribution limits, and sidestep source 
restrictions prohibiting corporations and unions from 
spending treasury funds on federal campaigns. Even for-
eign agents may legally finance so-called issue ads. 
 The scope of electioneering issue ads has expanded 
dramatically in the last three election cycles. The amount 
spent by parties and groups on electioneering issue ads 
swelled from $30 million in 1998 to more than $200 mil-
lion in 2000. Viewers see more and more ads, but as long 
as the ads avoid using magic words, the electorate gets less 
and less information about who is behind them.
 Many scholars, regulators, and politicians have for 
some time doubted the usefulness of the magic words test. 
This study sheds light on just how few advertisements 
exist today that use those magic words to communicate 
electioneering message. Data about the content of televi-
sion ads in the 1998 and 2000 elections demonstrate that 
in modern-day ad campaigns, explicit words of advocacy 
are virtually non-existent. The magic words test appears 
to have been eclipsed by modern advertising techniques, 
though it remains in many corners the prevailing standard 
for express advocacy. 
 This is an executive summary of the full report of 
Buying Time 2000. The full report is available through the 
Brennan Center.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The primary objective of this study is to establish a strong 
factual foundation which policy-makers, opinion leaders, 
and citizens can use to add depth and accuracy to the 
debate over political ads, especially issue ads. This project 
gives a systematic description and analysis of the political 
advertising in the 2000 elections, with special emphasis 
on the role issue ads have come to play in influencing 
elections. The major topic explored in this study is the 
extent to which parties and groups have used the issue ad 
loophole to shield their electioneering activity and avoid 
federal campaign finance law. In order to achieve this 
objective, three separate, powerful databases on campaign 
television advertising in 1998 and 2000 have been cre-
ated. These data sets have been used to test assumptions 
about the purposes of political advertising and to chart the 
roles of candidates, parties, and special interest groups in 
providing the nation with the information that influences 
the body politic.
METHODOLOGY
Research for the Buying Time studies began in March 1999. 
Using satellite technology to capture all political commer-
cials televised in the nation’s 75 largest media markets, 
the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) compiled 
a massive database that could serve as the foundation 
for extensive analysis of the nature and role of television 
advertising in politics. The Brennan Center convened a 
group of political scientists and lawyers to devise a coding 
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protocol to analyze the ads captured by CMAG. The result 
was a 26-question protocol, which included questions on 
the tone of ads (whether they promoted, attacked, or 
contrasted candidates), the themes mentioned, whether a 
candidate narrated the ad, whether a party label was men-
tioned, whether the ad used supporting sources to bolster 
its claims, and more. Under the direction of University of 
Wisconsin Professor Kenneth Goldstein, university stu-
dents coded over 2,100 unique ads (300,000 airings in 
all) from 1998 congressional elections, which was then 
merged with CMAG broadcast information. Broadcast 
information included data on timing, geographic markets, 
and number of airings. The study was replicated for the 
2000 elections, with a much larger database of more than 
3,500 unique ads that aired more than 940,000 times, 
and is reported here.
 Buying Time 2000 also makes use of a third database 
on “soft money,” money that enters the electoral politics 
but escapes campaign finance regulation. Because soft 
money often funds electioneering issue ads, much of the 
policy debate on how to address issue advocacy in federal 
elections focuses on whether, and how, soft money should 
be regulated. To advance that debate, the authors com-
piled a comprehensive database of soft money expen-
ditures in federal elections by national and state party 
committees in all 50 states. The soft money database con-
sists of more than 375,000 records of how parties spend 
their soft money dollars.
SCOPE OF ADVERTISING
As in the Buying Time study of the 1998 congressional 
elections, federal campaigns are the exclusive focus of 
this study. But while Buying Time 1998 was limited to con-
gressional general elections, Buying Time 2000 includes 
data on the congressional primaries and general elections, 
as well as the presidential primaries and presidential gen-
eral election. As a result, this year’s report is broader 
in scope and can draw comparisons with the advertising 
activity of 1998.
 The television advertising database shows that there 
were 940,755 airings of political commercials in federal, 
gubernatorial, and judicial elections over the 2000 calen-
dar year in the nation’s top 75 media markets. These ads 
were aired at a cost conservatively estimated at $672 mil-
lion. In federal elections only, a total of 2,871 unique ads 
were aired 845,923 times at an estimated cost of $629 
million. Even in terms of exclusively congressional gen-
eral elections, the number of ads and spending in 2000 
increased by more than a third over 1998 levels.
 Group-sponsored ads increased notably over 1998 
levels. In 2000, there were a total of 142,421 airings of 
ads by independent groups at a cost conservatively esti-
mated at $98 million—about 55,000 of those ads were 
aired in the congressional general election alone at a cost 
of $35 million. By comparison, in 1998 groups spent less 
than $11 million to air 21,712 ads in the congressional 
general elections.
CONTENT OF ADVERTISING
Buying Time 2000 demonstrates that the magic words 
test has little foundation, if any, in advertising reality. 
Coders found that 96% of electioneering ads by groups 
lacked magic words and 98% of party ads lacked magic 
words. Most tellingly, 90% of candidate ads—which are 
by definition considered express advocacy whether they 
use magic words or not—did not employ magic words. 
The fact that so few candidate ads incorporate magic 
words highlights how unnecessary explicit words are to 
convey an explicit electioneering message. That parties 
and groups can also effectively convey their electioneer-
ing messages without express advocacy is thus not surpris-
ing, but the legal ramifications are enormous. Avoiding 
magic words has no value for candidates, but for parties 
and groups it means that ads can be paid for with funds 
that (i) would otherwise be illegal under federal campaign 
finance law, and (ii) oftentimes are not disclosed to the 
public.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FLORIDA
The data show that the Bush campaign and the national 
Republican Party paid for nearly $12 million in television 
buys in California in the general election, nearly as much 
as they spent on television in Florida. Gore and the Dem-
ocratic Party all but ignored Republican efforts in Cali-
fornia, spending just $107,000 on television in that state. 
Instead they focused their efforts on the state of Florida, 
which in the final weeks appeared more and more like a 
toss-up than a Republican stronghold. 
 The spending of Republican campaign dollars in Cali-
fornia enabled Gore to outspend Bush in several other key 
states. Despite being outspent nationwide on television 
time by Bush and the Republican Party $86 million to $64 
million, Gore and the Democratic Party bought more air-
time in Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, and Wisconsin—each one an important swing state 
that Bush narrowly lost. 
 In Florida, combined Bush and Republican Party 
spending was nearly even with Gore and Democratic Party 
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spending in the critical markets of West Palm Beach, 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Orlando. However, the Repub-
lican campaign was able to outspend the Democrats in the 
conservative media markets of Pensacola and Jacksonville, 
as well as in the crucially important Miami market. Over-
all, Bush and the Republican Party ultimately outspent 
Gore and the Democratic Party in Florida by more than 
$6 million. Combined television spending by Bush, the 
Republican Party, and pro-Bush groups amounted to $4.7 
million more than the combined spending by Gore, the 
Democratic Party, and pro-Gore groups.
SENATE ELECTIONS
Spending $176.5 million on TV time nationwide, the gen-
eral election campaigns for the 34 U.S. Senate seats were 
even more costly (in total) than the presidential campaign. 
Candidates accounted for 72% of the spending, while par-
ties accounted for 22% and groups just 6%. Republican 
candidates and Democratic candidates spent roughly the 
same on ads, $62 million to $65 million. But excluding the 
New Jersey Senate race from the equation leaves Demo-
cratic candidates trailing Republican candidates $50 mil-
lion to $60 million in ad spending. The Democratic Party 
poured $21 million into the Senate races compared to 
$16 by the Republican Party; pro-Democrat groups spent 
$4 million compared to $6.5 million by pro-Republican 
groups.
HOUSE ELECTIONS
House candidates, combined, spent about $80 million on 
television ads, followed by $43 million by the parties and 
$24.5 million by independent groups. Democratic can-
didates spent $43 million compared to $35 million by 
Republican candidates. The Democratic Party spent $24 
million compared to the $19 million by the Republican 
Party. Democratic groups were outspent by Republican 
groups $13 million to $10 million. Surprisingly, the House 
elections drew more attention from special interest groups 
than any other type of election. Groups aired more than 
half of their ads in House elections, more than what they 
aired in the presidential and Senate elections combined.
COMPETITIVE RACES
As one might expect, the congressional races which ana-
lysts expected to be competitive attracted most of the 
spending on television advertising. In the Senate races, 
candidates raised and spent on average four times more 
on advertising in competitive than in non-competitive 
Senate elections. Television spending by parties and inter-
est groups was about 10 times higher in competitive than 
in non-competitive elections.
 Television time in House general elections flowed to 
the hotly contested races. In the 2000 elections, about 
10% of House races were considered competitive by elec-
tion analysts. More than 74% of television advertisements 
aired within these 45 competitive races, and group spend-
ing also tracked closely with competitiveness. Interest 
groups ran ads in only 49 of the 435 House districts.
 Party spending tracked closely with competitiveness 
as well. The parties aired ads in only 48 House races, 
and while they spent $43 million on ads, a third of that 
spending ($14.4 million) was directed at just six House 
districts: New Jersey’s 12th, California’s 36th, New York’s 
2nd, Florida’s 22nd, California’s 27th and Michigan’s 8th. 
MINORITY CANDIDATES
The data also cast doubt on a claim recently raised by 
some members of Congress: that soft money is used by 
the Democratic Party to increase voter turnout for candi-
dates of color. The soft money database compiled by the 
Brennan Center reveals how the parties actually spent this 
money in the 2000 elections. Only 81⁄2 cents out of every 
soft money dollar of the national and 50 state party com-
mittees was spent for any activity reasonably associated 
with get-out-the-vote, voter registration, or voter mobili-
zation. The greatest bulk of soft money spending by the 
parties went to buy electioneering issue ads on television, 
radio, and direct mail. This suggests that the main goal 
of party soft money spending is to campaign for candi-
dates in competitive districts, not to increase voter turn-
out nationally or in districts with candidates of color (see 
Figure 1).
TIMING
Candidate, party, and group ads shared similar advertising 
patterns over time. While candidate ads made up a larger 
percentage of ads overall, all three players meted out their 
messages in approximately the same proportions from 
week to week. In the final four weeks of the campaign, 
candidates aired 50% of their ads, parties aired 50% of 
their ads, and groups aired 60% of their ads. 
 Significantly, however, is the change in the nature 
of issue advocacy as Election Day nears. While genuine 
issue ads aired throughout the calendar year of 2000, and 
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almost all genuine issue ads aired before Labor Day when 
Congress casts nearly all of its key votes, electioneering 
issue ads aired mostly in the final two months before the 
election. This new breed of electioneering issue ads not 
only overwhelmed genuine issue ads shortly before Elec-
tion Day, but it also changed the tone of the election itself. 
Electioneering issue ads right before the election were the 
most negative in tone and personal in their attacks.
TONE AND THEMES
The tone of ads depended heavily on the sponsor. Candi-
dates relied mostly on ads that were positive, while par-
ties and groups depended on negative ads, especially in the 
late stages of a campaign. In the final two months of the 
election, more than 50% of candidate ads were positive, 
while both party and group ads were 53% negative respec-
tively. Electioneering issue ads by groups were the most 
negative of any type of ad.
 Overall, ads by Democratic sponsors (i.e. candidates, 
parties, and groups) most frequently addressed the issue 
of health care, while the Republican sponsors’ favorite 
issue was education. Surprisingly, the issue of taxes played 
somewhat infrequently among both parties. In the aggre-
gate, among all ads sponsored by candidates, party com-
mittees, and groups, the issue of health care dominated. 
Education and social security also were frequent themes. 
While the major themes of electioneering issue ads more 
or less conformed to the themes of candidate ads, genuine 
issue ads tended to discuss decisively different topics, such 
as Medicare, abortion, and trade.
ISSUE ADS 60 DAYS BEFORE THE 
GENERAL ELECTION
In the two months prior to the 2000 election, very few of 
the group issue ads were aired to promote an issue; most 
group issue ads encouraged the election or defeat of can-
didates. Within 60 days of the election there were 50,950 
group issue ads featuring candidates for federal office. Of 
these, 99% of the airings were electioneering in nature. 
Only 331 airings were genuinely about an issue or bill 
pending before Congress. Most of the genuine issue ads 
featuring candidates (about 80%) were aired before the 
60-day mark. This is consistent with the general under-
standing of political debate: the weeks immediately prior 
to the election are the time for arguments and advertise-
ments about candidates for office. Television spots also 
become increasingly expensive in the final weeks, driving 
many other potential advertisers temporarily off the air. 
Ads referring only to issues and not to candidates are less 
likely to be found in the months immediately preceding a 
race.
 In the 2000 election, the majority of group ads lacked 
magic words and thus were treated as issue ads, despite 
the fact that they promoted or attacked candidates, rather 
than raised awareness about an issue or pending legisla-
tion. Since most of the group issue ads had an election-
eering purpose, the fact that 75% of the group issue ads 
aired within 60 days of the election should not be surpris-
ing. As in 1998, genuine issue advocacy sharply dropped 
off with the increased proximity to Election Day, being 
replaced very nearly in toto by group-sponsored election-
eering issue ads. 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
1
Approximately $629 million was spent on television adver-
tising by all candidates, parties, and groups in the 2000 
federal elections. This figure represents an all-time record 
spent on political advertising. Even when looking at just 
congressional races, the $422 million spent in 2000 far 
exceeds the $177 million spent on political television ads 
in the 1998 congressional elections.
2
The magic words standard that some use to distinguish 
express advocacy from issue advocacy has no relation to 
the reality of political advertising. None of the players 
in political advertising—candidates, parties, or groups—
employ magic words such as “vote for,” “vote against,” 
“elect” or anything comparable with much frequency in 
their ads. Only 10% of candidates ads ever used magic 
words, and as few as 2% of party and groups ads used 
magic words.
3
Special interest groups increased their expenditures of 
political advertisements nine-fold since 1998, breaking all 
previous records. Conservatively estimated, special inter-
est groups spent about $98 million on political television 
ads in 2000—more than 58% of that spending went for 
electioneering issue ads.
4
Parties made record-breaking use of issue advocacy in the 
2000 elections. In addition to spending more on television 
advertising relative to the presidential general election 
than the candidates themselves, political parties primar-
ily aired issue ads rather than ads using magic words in 
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order to sidestep federal campaign finance laws limiting 
the amounts and sources of contributions. 
5
All of the so-called party issue ads, bar none, were elec-
tioneering in nature. None of these party ads qualified as 
genuine issue ads. The proportion of party ads that were 
positive in tone dropped since 1998, from 28% to 24%.
6
Genuine issue advocacy by groups is overwhelmed in the 
final 60 days of an election and is replaced by election-
eering issue ads. Approximately 86% of group-sponsored 
issue ads aired within 60 days of the 2000 general election 
were electioneering issue ads rather than genuine issue 
ads.
7
A legislative proposal (the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment) to estab-
lish a test for express advocacy based on whether an ad identifies a 
candidate within 60 days of the general election would be a sub-
stantial improvement over the magic words test. If the Snowe-
Jeffords 60-day bright-line test had been in place in 2000, 
only a fraction (less than 1%) of ads subject to financial dis-
closure would have been genuine issue ads (see Figure 2).
Preserving the integrity of the American campaign finance 
system requires constant vigilance. Each election cycle 
brings new innovations in campaign finance evasion as 
parties, candidates and groups strive to bend the system 
to their benefit. At times the existing rules and regulations 
seem more like fiction than fact, and new reforms at the 
federal level seem doomed before they are even proposed.
 However, public opinion has started to catch up with 
those who have for years taken advantage of the system 
in the pursuit of electoral success. Regardless of refined 
legal or policy distinctions in types of advertisements, the 
public is keenly aware that most political ads are indeed 
electioneering ads and that the political players are side-
stepping federal campaign finance laws. The legal commu-
nity has begun to catch up, recognizing the futility of the 
magic words test and taking steps to draft a more sophisti-
cated standard for regulating electioneering. Political sci-
entists, too, have drafted new laws and have responded 
to the dearth of information about the nature and scope 
of electioneering issue ads by conducting studies to shed 
light on this once-secretive tool.
 Combining the insights from these three communi-
ties adds to the likelihood that public policy will emerge 
that is grounded in common sense, legal expertise, and 
scholarship. The shared effort of citizens, lawyers, and 
political scientists working hand-in-hand with legislators 
creates room for optimism about a system few deny is in 
dire need of repair.
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Figure 1. How the Parties Spent the “Soft Money” Dollar, 2000 Election Cycle
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Figure 2. Genuine Issue Ads by Groups Aired Within 60 Days of the Election that Depict a Candidate, as a Proportion of All Group Ads 
that Depict a Candidate in the Same Time Period
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